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Network mappingThe paper presents a novel technique to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks applied by misbe-
having nodes in wireless networks with the presence of hidden nodes employing the widely used
IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) protocols described in the IEEE standard
[1]. Attacker nodes alter the IEEE802.11DCFﬁrmware to illicitly capture the channel via elevating
the probability of the average number of packets transmitted successfully using up the bandwidth
share of the innocent nodes that follow the protocol standards.Weobtained the theoretical network
throughput by solving two-dimensional Markov Chain model as described by Bianchi [2], and Liu
and Saadawi [3] to determine the channel capacity. We validated the results obtained via the theo-
retical computationswith the results obtained byOPNET simulator [4] to deﬁne the baseline for the
average attainable throughput in the channel under standard conditions where all nodes follow the
standards. The main goal of the DoS attacker is to prevent the innocent nodes from accessing the
channel and by capturing the channel’s bandwidth. In addition, the attacker strives to appear as an
innocent node that follows the standards. The protocol resides in every node to enable each node to
police other nodes in its immediate wireless coverage area. All innocent nodes are able to detect and
identify the DoS attacker in its wireless coverage area. We applied the protocol to two Physical
Layer technologies: Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency Hopping Spread
Spectrum (FHSS) and the results are presented to validate the algorithm.
ª 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Cairo University.Introduction
IEEE 802.11 DCF speciﬁcations list two mechanisms to trans-
mit a packet. The basic mechanism is a two-way handshaking
method called ‘‘Basic Access’’ which employs immediate trans-
mission of a positive acknowledgement (ACK) by thedestination node after a successful reception of a packet.
ACK packets are required since the sender is unable to deter-
mine if each packet is successfully transmitted by listening to
its own transmission. The second mechanism uses a four-way
handshaking scheme called ‘‘Request-to-Send/Clear-to-Send’’
(RTS/CTS) before transmitting any packet. A node that
is conﬁgured to use RTS/CTS mode performs channel
reservation by sending out RTS short frame. The available re-
ceiver node responds to an RTS frame by sending back a CTS
frame, and then packets contain data and ACK packet re-
sponse follows. RTS frames may encounter collisions, which
are detected by the absence of CTS responses. RTS/CTS mode
increases the performance of the network through decreasing
416 J. Soryal et al.the duration of a collision for long messages. In this paper, our
focus is on DoS detection in the four-way handshaking scheme
using ‘‘RTS/CTS’’ mode.
Malicious nodes employ several techniques to illegally
increase their throughputs and capture the channel on the
expense of other fair behaving nodes as demonstrated by Lolla
et al. [5]. In IEEE 802.11, selﬁsh nodes manipulate the back-off
timer to increase their probabilities in having successful trans-
missions by simply decreasing the back-off timer value instead
of following the back-off timer generation method that all
nodes in the network are using. A node is considered malicious
when it deviates from the IEEE 802.11 MAC Standard [1].
Attackers employ shorter timeouts than these speciﬁed in the
standards. With IEEE 802.11, nodes choose a back-off interval
before attempting a transmission. The back-off interval gets to
be increased according to set of rules before every retransmis-
sion attempt after every failed transmission. Attacker nodes
choose a small or a ﬁxed back-off interval before transmission
attempts that does not follow the IEEE 802.11 standard.
Detecting the back-off manipulation is very challenging due
to its randomness as presented by Bellardo and Savage [6],
Raya et al. [7], and Radosavac et al. [8]. The purpose of the pro-
posed algorithm in this paper is to detect DoS attackers.
A major contribution in this paper is that the algorithm
works in a wireless network with the presence of hidden nodes
utilizing the mathematical results of Markov Chain modelling
as baseline. Also, a network mapping algorithm is used to
detect the network’s topology. Several researchers worked to
detect the manipulation of the back-off timer in wireless net-
works where there are trusted Access Points (AP) as presented
by Kyasanur and Vaidya [9], and Raya et al. [7], where a
trusted AP regulates the senders’ back-off timer values and de-
tect the misbehaving nodes. Ad-hoc networks do not have cen-
tralized authority that assigns and monitors the back-off timer
values for each node, which is a challenging task. The pre-
sented algorithm can be applied to a distributed environment
where there is no centralized authority or a supervisor node
(i.e. Access Point) that is supervising every transaction takes
place between different users. As demonstrated by Lolla
et al. [5] where the authors assume that the nodes are cooper-
ating and they announce the state of their pseudo-random se-
quences so node monitors the behavior of other nodes. This
approach assumes the cooperation from an attacker which is
not realistic. Our algorithm does not expect or wait for any
cooperation from any node hence eliminating the chance of
getting fed wrong information by a malicious node. Bora
et al. [10] introduced a new parameter to indicate the level of
cooperation of each node which increases the complexity of
each transaction throughout the whole communication ses-
sion. Our algorithm utilizes the already-used CTS packets in
IEEE 802.11 to perform the detection process by further pro-
cessing the CTS packets and appending a new ﬁeld to the exist-
ing ‘‘Hello’’ packets only once during the communication
session. Alsahag and Othman [11] proposed a method to make
the AP functions as a watchdog to monitor all nodes’ behav-
iors. This method consumes the resources of the AP node
and is not suitable to a total distributed system like ad-hoc
networks. Assigning one node or selected nodes to police the
network is a very dangerous concept and creates a single point
of failure in case the police node is compromised itself. Rong
[12] proposes to analyze the distribution of inter-delivery
times between two consecutive successful transmissions. Thismethod is very challenging and requires very accurate measur-
ing clocks in the order of micro seconds to accurately detect
the selﬁsh behavior. Our algorithm does not require any hard-
ware additions or clocks. The majority of researches that were
performed on back-off timer manipulation detection assumed
that there are no hidden nodes as presented by Soryal and Saa-
dawi [13]. Few papers presented the concept of detection with
the presence of hidden nodes as described by Lolla et al. [5],
and Ca´rdenas et al. [14]. Lolla et al. [5] assume cooperation
among nodes, which is not realistically applicable to DoS at-
tacks. Raya et al. [7] propose new messages to the existing
packets used by IEEE 802.11 which increases the network
overhead unnecessarily. The following sections include
description to the IEEE 802.11 DCF CTS/RTS scheme and
the DoS impact. The throughput analysis for Markov Chain
and the algorithm with the results are presented to prove the
concept and the validity of the algorithm.
Methodology
CTS/RTS mode
IEEE 802.11 DCF standards [1] use Carrier Sense Multiple
Access/Collision Avoidance CSMA/CA mechanism to reduce
the probability of collisions in a wireless network to enhance
the throughput. Time is divided into slots. Each slot deﬁnes
the inter-frame-space (IFS) intervals and determines the
back-off values for nodes inside the network. Whenever a node
has a packet to transmit, it senses the medium and if it is busy,
the node waits until the medium becomes idle for a period
equivalent to the Distributed Inter Frame Space (DIFS) period,
and then computes a random back-off time which is speciﬁed
by an integer value and is equivalent to a number of time slots.
The Contention Window (CW) is the idle period after a DIFS
period.
Nodes are only allowed to transmit at the beginning of each
Slot-Time. The Slot-Time size (Sigma) is set equal to the time
needed for a node to detect a packet transmission from adjacent
nodes inside its coverage network. Slot Time values are deter-
mined by the physical layer used by the MAC protocol, and
it takes into consideration the propagation delay which is de-
ﬁned as the time required to switch from the receiving to the
transmitting state and also for the time to signal to the MAC
the state of the channel deﬁned as (Busy Detect Time). Nodes
with packets to transmit select a back-off based on the Conten-
tion Window deﬁned as [Back-off = int(CW · rand · slot
time)]. The term ‘‘rand’’ is a random number uniformly distrib-
uted between 0 and 1, and CWmin < CW<CWmax, where
CWmin is the minimum CW, and CWmax is the maximum
CW. Firstly, the node that has a packet to transmit selects a
back-off time in the range [0, CWmin  1], where CWmin is
the minimum Contention Window size. When the channel gets
to idle state, after another DIFS period, nodes decrement the
back-off timers until the medium becomes busy again or until
the timer value reaches zero.
If the timer has not reached zero and the medium becomes
busy, the node freezes its timer. This process continues until
the timer reaches zero then the node transmits the packet. If
the sender receives an ACK from the destination, the transmis-
sion is assumed to be successful and the node sets its CW back
to CWmin  1. If two or more nodes decrement their timers to
reach zero simultaneously, the packets will collide, and each
Fig. 1 Network conﬁguration.
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doubling the Contention Window value [2* CWmin]. During
the kth retransmission attempt the Contention Window will
have the form [0.2k* CWmin] and will be doubled until it
reaches CWmax.
The MAC parameter values (Slot Time, SIFS, DIFS, ACK,
CTS, RTS and CW) are dependent on the physical layer being
used by the MAC protocol. In this paper, we are applying the
developed algorithm on two different systems, the ﬁrst is using
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and the second
is using direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) as shown in
Table 1.
1. IEEE 802.11 – Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum
(FHSS):
FHSS operates in the 2.4 GHz band with a range starting
from 2.402 GHz to 2.480 GHz. Each channel has a width of
1 MHz. FHSS supports two rates of 1 Mbps and 2 Mbps.
There are seventy-eight hopping sequences and each sequence
would use seventy-nine hops. Fifteen systems could be collo-
cated and work independently with minimal amount of
collisions.
2. IEEE 802.11b – Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
(DSSS):
DSSS operates in the 2.4 GHz band. Each channel has a
width of 22. The rates deﬁned in IEEE 802.11 are 1 Mbps
and 2 Mbps and the rates in IEEE 802.11.b standard are
5.5 Mbps and 11 Mbps. Only the ﬁrst 11 channels are used
in the United States.
Network conﬁguration and DoS attack impact
The network conﬁguration is presented in Fig. 1 where there
are three areas A, B, and C. Nodes located in area B can hear
all other nodes located in areas B and C. Nodes located in area
A can hear all other nodes located in areas A and C. Nodes in
area B cannot hear nodes in area A and vice versa.
The algorithm is scalable and deals with the number of
nodes in each area as an independent variable and performs
the calculations accordingly. For the sake of simplicity in
presenting this paper and conducting the simulations, we as-
sume that the number of nodes in each area is constant,Table 1 PHY layer parameters.
Parameter FHSS DSSS
Slot Time ‘‘r’’ 50 us 20 us
SIFS 28 us 10 us
DIFS 128 us 50 us
PHY header 128 bits 192 and 96 (us)
MAC header 272 bits 28 bytes
ACK 112 bits 14 bytes
CTS 112 bits 14 bytes
RTS 160 bits 20 bytes
Channel bit rate 1 Mbps 11 Mbps
CWmin, CWmax 15, 1023 31, 1023
Packet size 8000 bits 8000 bits
Signal extension N/A N/Aalthough the Markov Chain model handles any variable num-
ber of nodes in general.
The DoS attacker can implement the attack by several meth-
ods. The most prevalent method is altering the ﬁrmware code
on the Network Interface Card (NIC). Also, in some instances
attackers modify the hardware. The ﬁrst method is a much eas-
ier to implement from the feasibility and cost point of view. In
our paper, the solution is directed toward detecting the manip-
ulation of the protocol’s ﬁrmware and more speciﬁcally detect-
ing the manipulation of the back-off timer. In this case the DoS
attacker keeps transmitting packets that do not contain any
useful information just to occupy the channel. The attacker
backs off only one slot every time a packet is ready to be sent
out or when it encounters a collision while the other innocent
nodes follow the exponential back-off mechanism.
We simulated a network with an attacker present to show
the effect on the other innocent nodes. The payload size used
throughout this paper is 8000 bits so it can be sent in one time
slot without the need of fragmentation.
For the simplicity, we assume the following constant num-
ber of nodes in each area throughout the paper – these num-
bers are used for the simulations and solving the Markov
Chain: area A has 2 nodes, area B has 3 nodes, and area C
has 2 nodes as shown in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 2 the simulation shows the comparisons between
trafﬁc sent by innocent nodes under fair conditions without
the attacker (red line) and the trafﬁc sent with the attacker
present (blue line) for a network using DSSS technology.
The effect of the DoS attack on the innocent nodes is very clear
that once the attacker existed the innocent nodes are deprived
from accessing the channel to send anything.Markov Chain
Fig. 3 shows a two-state Markov Chain model that models the
IEEE 802.11 wireless network. Such model is extracted for
each of the three areas (A, B and C) as shown in Fig. 1. This
allows obtaining each node’s throughput values for the pur-
pose of identify the attack. Bianchi’s Markov Chain model
[2] and Liu and Saadawi [3] is extended to calculate the
individual rate in ‘‘Packets per second’’ values for each node
in each area. One of our contributions here is extending Bian-
chi’s model which is only applicable to wireless networks with-
out hidden nodes to be able to calculate the throughput with
the presence of hidden nodes.
The assumption is that all nodes have packets to transmit
all the time (saturation condition) and the number of nodes
is ﬁxed during the communication session.
Fig. 2 Data trafﬁc sent comparison using DSSS technology.
418 J. Soryal et al.Firstly, we obtain the Transmission Probability for each
area to calculate the throughput for this speciﬁc area and ﬁnal-
ly obtain the individual throughput for each located in this
speciﬁc area.
b(t): stochastic process representing the back-off time coun-
ter for any given node. (t and t+ 1) correspond to the begin-
ning of two consecutive slot times.
na, nb, and nc are the number of nodes in areas A, B, and C
respectively.
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According to the given topology, p in the different area
pa ¼ 1 ð1 sdÞndð1 saÞna1
pb ¼ 1 ð1 sdÞndð1 seÞneð1 sbÞnb1
pc ¼ 1 ð1 sdÞnd1ð1 saÞnað1 sbÞnb
Throughput in the different area:
Pi,tr is deﬁned as the probability that least one transmission
occurs within node i’s coverage area in a random time slot.
Pi;tr ¼ 1 ð1 siÞ
Y
u¼all i’s neighbours
ð1 suÞ ð3Þl for a given IEEE 802.11 wireless network.
Table 2 Comparison between average throughputs (packets/s)
for each area.
PHY technology Area A Area B Area C
FHSS (simulation) 100 110 100
FHSS (theoretical) 105 110 105
DSSS (simulation) 360 360 270
DSSS (theoretical) 510 520 510
DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes 419Pi,success is the probability that node i successfully transmits its
packet to another node, and this equals the probability that ex-
actly only one node transmits on the channel covered by node i
in a given time slot, and no hidden node transmits either.
Hence the formulas for Pi,tr and Pi,success are given by
Pi;success ¼ si
Y
u¼all i’s neighbours
ð1 suÞ
Y
v¼i’s hidden station
ð1 svÞ ð4Þ
Let throughputi be the normalized capacity of node i,
throughputi ¼
Pi;successE½P
ð1 Pi;trÞrþ Pi;successTS þ ½Pi;tr  Pi;successTC
ð5Þ
E[length] is the average length of a slotted time and E[payload]
is the average packet payload size. Pi,successE[payload] is the
average amount of payload information successfully sent out
in a time slot. E[length] will be (1  Pi,tr)r+ Pi,successTS +
[Pi,tr  Pi,success]TC. r is the duration of a time slot. Here the
term (1  Pi,tr) accounts for an idle time slot with probability
1  Pi,tr. Pi,successTS is the successful transmissions of node i
with successful probability of Pi,success. The term [Pi,tr  Pi,success]
TC represents the collision duration. TS is the average time
needed for a successful transmission, and TC is the average
duration for the collision. TC and TS are then derived for the
RTS/CTS mechanism. Obtaining the throughputs for RTS/
CTS accesses the mechanism:
Then we obtain sx and px
TS;rts ¼ ½tphy þRTS þ SIFSþ dþ ½tphy þ CTS þ SIFSþ d
þ ½tphy þ tMAC þ E½packet þ SIFSþ dþ ½tphy þACK
þDIFSþ dTC;rts
¼ ½tphy þRTS þDIFSþ d
throughputa ¼
Pa;successE½P
ð1 Pa;trÞrþ Pa;successTS þ ½Pa;tr  Pa;successTC
ð6Þ
throughputb ¼
Pb;successE½P
ð1 Pb;trÞrþ Pb;successTS þ ½Pb;tr  Pb;successTC
ð7Þ
throughputc ¼
Pc;successE½P
ð1 Pc;trÞrþ Pc;successTS þ ½Pc;tr  Pc;successTC
ð8Þ
To validate the theoretical results described above, we com-
pared the numerical results produced by solving the Markov
Chain using parameters listed in Table 1 with the results gen-
erated by OPNET [4] simulator under the saturation condi-
tion. Matlab [15] was used to solve the Markov Chain and
obtain the numerical results.
Table 2 shows the values obtained from Markov Chain
modelling and from OPNET simulation to show the average
achievable throughput (packets/s) for each area for both FHSS
and DSSS under saturation conditions. Since all nodes have
the same condition, then every node has the same probability
in accessing the channel which is translated to same average
number of packets transmitted into the channel over time. This
table bridges the value of the theoretical calculations and
empirical results and shows the signiﬁcance of the detection
thresholds accuracy. It is noted that the results for areas Aand B are slightly different in the simulation results because
of the imperfection of wireless nature. It is also noted in Table 2
that the theoretical results are generally higher than the calcu-
lations due to the imperfections in the environment that would
negatively affect the throughput, and the simulator used takes
into account such imperfections to simulate real environments.
One beneﬁt of using the theoretical results as opposed to
empirical results that the theoretical results generate higher
values of thresholds which help eliminating false positives.
As shown in the previous section that the number of the
CTS packets received is equal to number of data packets
transmitted.
Detection process
According to the IEEE 802.11 implementations, the number of
successful data packets transmitted by any given node is equal
to the CTS packets received by this speciﬁc node. The CTS
packets are designed to be heard by every single node within
its coverage area. All the nodes besides the one that the CTS
packet is destined to, will have to update their NAV so other
nodes halt transmitting any packets during the NAV period
to eliminate the chances of collisions. We modiﬁed the OPNET
[4] code to hear all CTS packets individually and collect them
in separate queues depending on the destination address. Be-
low is the result from the simulation to prove that the number
of received CTS packets is equal to the number of data packets
sent. Simulation results show that the number of CTS received
by node_1 is the same number of packets sent by this speciﬁc
node to other nodes in the network. Based on that concept, the
detection algorithm depends on modifying the IEEE 802.11
DCF ﬁrmware to equip each node to monitor the network
with very low cost (in terms of processing and memory con-
sumption) solution without introducing new types of messages
or altering the existing messages. Basically, the algorithm that
resides in each node further processes the received CTS packets
before discarding it. Upon network communication initializa-
tion, which includes the initial exchange of Hello packets,
every node maps out which nodes it can sense in its range
and compile a list of MAC addresses that it can communicate
with. This list is broadcasted by all the nodes. Then each node
compares its list to other nodes’ lists. If the two lists (its own
and the other node) match then both nodes belong to the same
domain and marks that domain for node count (area A or B in
Fig. 1).
If the two lists do not match then this node identiﬁes itself
as an overlapping node that shares two domains (area C in
Fig. 1). The lack of cooperation from the attacker does not im-
pact the results because the detection threshold has enough tol-
erance to account for a missing count from a node. The
algorithm has two phases that run in series. The ﬁrst phase
Compare Rcvd (List_1 to List_nk) /\ (all received lists from all other
nodes \/) to List_x /\ (my generated list) \/
If List_nk /\ Matches my List (Same number of nodes and same
nodes can be heard) \/
Then /\ (We are neighbours in the same area) \/
Update Node Count /\ (For the same area) \/
Else /\ (We do not belong to same area or I belong to an overlapping
area) \/
Update Node Count /\ (For the those areas) \/
If (number of Nodes in my area > Number of Nodes in others)
Then (I am in an overlapping area)
/\ This function to determine if a node is in an overlapping area \/
/\ At the end of this phase each node knows how many nodes in its
immediate area and other areas – also, the nodes in overlapping area
know themselves) \/
Phase II: Detection:
Each node implements the detection algorithm
Count nk /\ ‘‘Number of Nodes in the immediate area and other
areas’’ \/
Create nk Counters
Calculate Average Throughput for each node /\ based on Markov
Chain modelling above for each area \/
When CTS Received
If (Destination Address = My Address)
Do Nothing
Else
{
Update Counter (Destination Address)
Calculate Rate
/\ rate of received CTS packets/second for each Destination
Address \/ }
If
CTS_node_x rate < Average Individual Throughput
Do Nothing
Else
Announce ‘‘node_x is implementing DoS attack’’ /\ it is shown as
print command in our OPNET simulation and used it as output \/
End
420 J. Soryal et al.is the network mapping where all the nodes determine their
coverage area to decide which Markov Chain Throughput
equation should be used, either an exclusive domain (‘‘A’’ or
‘‘B’’) or an overlapping area (‘‘C’’). Accordingly each node
chooses the appropriate Markov Chain equation to generate
the throughput. The lists created during the network mapping
phase are appended to the Hello packets and is only exchanged
once among the nodes after the initialization of the network.
Each node further processes each received list to derive the
number of the nodes in each area.
Example to explain the network mapping technique – using
Fig. 1:
Area ‘‘A’’ has 2 nodes: a1, a2.
Area ‘‘B’’ has 3 nodes: b1, b2,b3.
Area ‘‘C’’ has 2 nodes: c1, c2.
After the exchange of the List which includes all the MAC
addresses heard by those nodes, each node will have the fol-
lowing on its own list:
a1: (a2, c1, c2) a2: (a1, c1, c2).
b1: (b2, b3, c1, c2) b2: ((b1, b3, c1, c2) b3: ((b1, b2, c1, c2).
c1: (a1, a2, b1, b2, b3, c2) c2: (a1, a2, b1, b2, b3, c1).
Now, for instance node a1 compares its own list with the
others and it ﬁnds that the list from a2 is identical to its own list
except for the node itself, then it decides that a1 and a2 belong
to the same region and the number of nodes in this region is two
nodes for Markov Chain Throughput calculations as to which
equation to use. The same happens with all other nodes. When
it is c1’s turn to compare the lists, it ﬁnds that c2 has the same
number of nodes which leads node c1 to conclude that c1 and c2
belong to the same region. In addition, c1 ﬁnds its list (a1, a2,
b1, b2, b3, c2), is longer than the others heard then node c1 real-
izes that its location is in the overlapping area in Fig. 1 and will
use these numbers for the calculation of the throughput.
Phase I is triggered after the exchange of the ﬁrst round of
Hello packets and the lists are included in the second round of
Hello packets. The assumption is the number of nodes are
ﬁxed in each area throughout the communication session
and all nodes are not mobile. Following Phase I, Phase II is
triggered to detect the attackers based on the network topol-
ogy discovered in phase I.
The algorithm
The Algorithm that resides at each node is as follows:Phase I: Network Mapping:
Each node maps the network to know its own coverage area,
number of nodes in each area and to determine which throughput
equation generated by Markov Chain modelling should be used:
Start
Create List_x /\ List_x is the MAC addresses that node x can hear in
its domain: x = 1 to nk, where nk is the number of nodes in each
coverage area, k = A,B, or C \/
Broadcast List_x
Receive List_1 through List_nk /\ (excluding List_x which is my list
of MAC addresses) \/For the simulation, we use Matlab [15] to solve the Markov
Chain mathematical model and feed the results to OPNET
simulator for the detection threshold. The numerical results
are considered the average number of packets any node can
send in the presence of other number of nodes (as calculated
in Markov Chain modelling), so any other node that has more
packets successfully sent is not following the IEEE 802.11
DCF standard and manipulating the protocol to illegally in-
crease its throughput to attack the network.
Results and discussion
The simulation is conducted to show that innocent nodes in
multiple areas can detect the attacker via monitoring the num-
ber of CTS packets sent by all reachable nodes inside the net-
work. The simulation shows that the thresholds shown in
Table 2 are exceeded whenever an attacker is present in the
network which enables the innocent nodes to detect the attack-
er using the theoretical baselines generated by solving Markov
Chain and divided on the number of the nodes in each area
since all the channels operate under saturation condition. To
avoid false positives where an innocent node is falsely marked
Fig. 4 FHSS – Node c1 – Number of CTS packets heard by
innocent node for two other nodes – one of them is an attacker (a1
represented by the blue line).
Fig. 5 DSSS – Node c2 – Number of CTS packets heard by
innocent node for two other nodes – one of them is an attacker (a1
represented by the blue line).
Fig. 6 DSSS – Node a2 – Number of CTS packets heard by
innocent node for two other nodes – one of them is an attacker (c1
represented by the blue line).
DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes 421as an attacker, the algorithm does not react to instantaneous
spike but rather looks for a moving average over time to en-
sure that any spike by an innocent node is not mistaken for
an attacker. The simulation setting examined the presence of
the attacker node in two regions (A and C). So one round of
simulation runs assumed that the attacker is in area A and
the second run assumed that is in area C.
In Fig. 4 for the FHSS case and Fig. 5 for the DSSS case,
an innocent node in Area C is listening to the CTS packets sent
in the medium and ﬁnds that one node in Area A is exceeding
the threshold calculated for the channel in this area divided by
the number of nodes in this area. The blue line is for the at-
tacker and the red line is for another innocent node and the
difference is very signiﬁcant (more than 80 times for FHSS
and more than 270 times for DSSS). According to thethresholds calculated in area C, the channel capacity is
105 Packets/s (57 Packets/s per node) for FHSS and for DSSS
is 510 Packets/s (250 Packets/s per node) with the existence of
two nodes in each type, the attacker achieved number of trans-
mitted packets well over the threshold and is detected by this
innocent node and marked as an attacker.
In Fig. 6, an innocent node in area A was listening to the
CTS packets sent in the medium and found that one node in
area C is exceeding the threshold calculated for the channel
in this area divided by the number of nodes in this area.
According to the thresholds calculated in area C, for DSSS
is 510 Packets/s (250 Packets/s per node) with the existence
of two nodes, the attacker achieved number of transmitted
packets well over the threshold and is detected by this innocent
node and marked as an attacker.Conclusions
A novel approach to detect a node employing DoS attack in
the IEEE 802.11 wireless network with the presence of hidden
nodes was presented and the algorithm proved to be effective
as veriﬁed by the simulation. The approach is based on utiliz-
ing the numerical results obtained by solving the Markov
Chain model. Combining the numerical results with the speci-
ﬁcations of the IEEE 802.11 DCF RTS/CTS protocol, a devel-
oped code was embedded into IEEE 802.11 code to enable
individual nodes to monitor the network and detect the attack-
er. The simulation results proved our concept with very high
accuracy without any false positives recorded and this in part
caused by taking advantage of the higher values of the theoret-
ical results generated by solving Markov Chain model. This
solution is scalable and applicable for distributed environment
where there is no centralized authority overseeing the commu-
nication process and transaction among the nodes. In the
future, a method to combat the attack based on a game theo-
retic approach will be developed and will be appended to the
presented algorithm.
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